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Abstract 
We assess the impact of low-skilled immigration on capital intensity. We first present 
a model characterized by frictions in the labor market and firms' asymmetric information on 
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* Bank of Italy, Economics, Research and International Relations. 1 Introduction 1
In the last twenty years the rapid growth of world population, the persistence of
wide gaps in income, diverging population trends, and exceptional geo-political
changes have led to a huge increase in the number of migrants from the developing
and emerging to the advanced economies. These inows have raised concerns in
host economies, ranging from a worsening of labor market conditions for natives to
changes in the productive and technological structure, from increased crime rates
to deteriorating public nances. The attention paid to this topic by the economic
literature has consequently grown fast (Borjas, 1994).
This paper focuses on the impact of low-skilled immigration on capital intensity
from both a theoretical and empirical perspective. Through a theoretical model
based on workers' skill heterogeneity and imperfect labor markets, we set the stage
to study the link between an inow of low-skilled immigrants and rms' optimal
choices in terms of technology and productive factors. The model is a closed-
economy version of Helpman et al. (2010), which we generalize to a two-factor
(capital and blue-collar workers) production function. The key features are: i)
workers are heterogeneous in terms of skills, rms in terms of level of demand;
ii) rms have imperfect information on workers' skill and employ workers through
a costly process of search and screening; iii) immigrants have, on average, lower
abilities and fewer outside options than natives. In this model an increase in the
share of immigrants in a rm's labor force reduces, ex ante, its average productivity
and wages paid. Facing these changes, rms re-optimize their factor mix and may
change their degree of capital intensity in a direction that depends on the parameter
values; in particular, there is a range of parameters, which appears to be more likely
1Corresponding author: Andrea R. Lamorgese Address: Via Nazionale 91, 00192 Roma, Italy.
Email: andrea.lamorgese@bancaditalia.it.We wish to thank Giuseppe Parigi and Roberto Golinelli
for providing the data on capital stock, Guglielmo Barone, Carlo Devillanova, Luigi Infante, Gio-
vanni Mastrobuoni, Elisabetta Olivieri, Pierre Picard, Paolo Pinotti, Alfonso Rosolia and two
anonymous referees for their comments, as well as seminar participants at Bank of Italy, University
of Turi, Catholic University of Milan, NASM - Econometric Society (Boston, 2009), ESPE (Sevilla,
2009), AIEL (Sassari, 2009), CIDEI (Roma, 2009), Urban Economics Association (San Francisco,
2009). The usual disclaimer applies. The views expressed herein are those of the authors and not
necessarily those of Bank of Italy.
5in Italy, where the greater downward rigidity of wages with respect to productivity
makes labor relatively more expensive than capital, thus inducing rms to adopt
more capital-intensive technology. As a result, an increase in low-skilled immigration
may end up raising the capital-labor ratio.
The theoretical model is then tested on a dataset that combines very detailed
data on Italian manufacturing rms with provincial data on immigrants by country
of origin. The analysis, covering 1996-2007, includes the recent phase of rapid
acceleration of low-skilled immigration. Just to give some numbers, in 2008 there
were 3.4 million resident foreigners, about 6 per cent of the total population, against
less than half that share in 2003, and just 1 per cent in 1991. The immigrants are
mostly from the developing and emerging countries and are relatively young and
low-skilled (Bank of Italy, 2009).
In the empirical specication we relate rm-level changes in capital intensity
to province-level changes in the immigrant population from 20 emerging and de-
veloping countries. We address potential endogeneity biases in immigration ows
using an instrument based on the tendency of immigrants to move to pre-existing
enclaves, as in Altonji and Card (1991), Saiz (2007), and Card (2007). We control
for rm xed eects and other time-varying rm-level variables that are related to
the choice of capital and labor.
We nd a positive causal eect of low-skilled immigration on capital intensity,
that is quite stable and robust across empirical specications. In line with the
main predictions of the theoretical model, we nd that the impact is stronger on
rms with higher job turnover, on larger rms, and in sectors where the degree of
complementarity across workers is higher.
The empirical literature on the eects of immigration on the host economy is
extremely rich but is concerned primarily with the labor market outcomes of na-
tives.2 This paper relates to a more recent stream of literature aimed at assessing
how immigration aects a country's productive structure. The thesis is that an
2In such areas as employment, wages and type of occupations (or tasks), Okkerse (2008) provides
a survey of the labor market eects of immigration.
6exogenous immigration-induced increase in the availability of low-skilled workers
may cause a shift toward low-skill tasks and activities. In this strand of literature
it is useful to distinguish papers that only look at recomposition within the labor
force from those, like ours, that consider more than one input and extend the focus
to capital and technology. Among the former, Lewis (2004) and Card and Lewis
(2007) show that most of the increase in the relative supply of low-skilled labor in-
duced by low-skilled Mexican immigration to the US has been absorbed by changes
in skill intensity within narrowly dened industries; that is, the adjustment has not
occurred through a change in sectoral specialization, as the Heckscher-Ohlin model
would predict but rather within sectors, either across or within rms. Accord-
ing to Gandal et al. (2004), the high-skilled Russian immigration to Israel had an
analogous eect, but of opposite sign, with a shift toward more skill-intensive pro-
duction. On the basis of a German matched employer-employee dataset, Dustmann
and Glitz (2007) suggest that the technological adjustment is due to the within-rm
component: factor intensities shift toward relatively more intense use of low-skilled
workers.
With a focus on capital and technology, Peri (2009) uses the large variation in
the inow of immigrants across US states and nds that immigration causes an
increase in total factor productivity and a decrease in skill intensity. He nds no
signicant eect on capital intensity, measured by the ratio of capital to output. For
US manufacturing plants Lewis (2011) shows that an increase in the share of high-
school dropouts relative to high-school graduates induced by immigration in some
metropolitan area slows the adoption of automation technologies and decreases the
growth of capital-labor and capital-output ratios.
Our paper is quite close to Lewis (2011), but with two signicant dierences. In
the theoretical sphere we have a more general setting, with imperfect labor market
and heterogeneous workers, thus generating a more complex set of results. Our
empirical exercise has a dierent focus, since rather than assess the consequences
of the increased availability of unskilled workers we estimate the impact on the
7capital-labor ratio of the ethnic composition of the blue-collar workforce, which in
turn aects average skills.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section we present
the theoretical model; then we describe the empirical specication (section 3), and
the data (section 4). Section 5 presents the results, and section 6 concludes.
2 The theoretical model
In this section we present a theoretical model oering both a conceptual framework
within which to analyze the relationship between immigration and capital intensity
and theoretical guidance to the empirical analysis. The model is a closed economy
version of Helpman et al. (2010), which we generalize to a two-factor production
function. It analyzes the impact of immigration on the capital-labor ratio in a labor
market characterized by asymmetric information. More specically, we assume that
workers' abilities are heterogeneous but not directly observable by rms. Firms can
pay to screen workers and get an imprecise signal on a worker's ex-post match-
specic heterogeneous ability and thus improve the composition of their workforce
and their productivity. Since immigrants are assumed to be, on average, less skilled
than natives, rms facing a larger share of immigrants in their local labor market
tend to have lower productivity. From a rm's perspective, this \negative" eect of
immigration can be balanced by lower labor costs, as immigrants have fewer outside
options and therefore are paid lower wages. Thus immigration, through the eects
on productivity and wages, ends up aecting a rm's optimal decision on capital
intensity.
2.1 Market demand and technology
Suppose that each rm i faces a xed demand Di randomly drawn from a generic
continuous distribution g(D). We identify rms by the realization of their demand,
and suppress the index i in what follows.
In order to meet demand, a rm produces using capital (K) and production
8workers (L). Since our focus is on low-skilled immigration from less developed
countries, and, according to the Italian Labor Force survey, 90 percent of foreigners
in Italian manufacturing are blue-collar workers, we simplify by not considering
white-collar workers in the production process.3
We combine capital and (blue-collar) labor through a CES constant-return-to-











where  > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor, and  cap-
tures the degree of capital intensity of the production process. Notice that workers
are complementary; that is, the average skill of blue-collar workers ( a) aects labor
productivity proportionally, and  > 1 measures the degree of complementarity.
2.2 Labor market
The labor market part of the model builds on the recent contribution by Helpman
et al. (2010). We assume an imperfectly functioning labor market where workers
have heterogeneous abilities (a) that are unobservable to the rms, hiring occurs
via costly search and screening, and wages are set through bargaining between
each worker and each rm. A worker's ability is ex-ante unobservable to the rm,
since it is assumed to be relation-specic; in other words, we assume that previous
matches between a worker and other rms are uninformative about that worker's
productivity in any current or future match. However, rms can pay for a screening
technology to get (ex-ante) a signal on a worker's match-specic ability. We assume
that the screening cost is xed, equal to fS, and the signal is imprecise in the
sense that rms can only detect whether a worker's ability is above or below a
certain threshold ac. While the decision to screen is endogenous, in our model the
threshold is xed exogenously, unlike in Helpman et al. (2010). The presence of a
xed screening cost, which a rm compares to the prots gains of screening, implies
3In the empirical analysis, we will control for the labor force composition by qualication.
9that in equilibrium there are screening and non-screening rms, depending on the
realization of demand D.
Unlike Helpman et al. (2010), we introduce two dierent groups of heterogeneous
workers, immigrants and natives, and assume that on average immigrants have lower
ability than natives. In line with our focus on low-skilled immigration, immigrants
are assumed to have less human capital and language skills, so that they end up
being less productive than natives in any given job. Consistently with the infor-
mation structure described above, rms know that immigrants are less productive
on average but do not observe the ability of the single worker, either immigrant or
native, that they might be hiring.
A rm is randomly matched with a set of workers whose distribution of abilities
mirrors that in the province where the rm is located. In particular, a worker's
ability is randomly drawn from one of the following Pareto distributions, depending
on whether he is native or immigrant:










where "F > "N > 1 are the shapes of the two distributions and aM is the
scale parameter. Equations (2) and (3) have the classical implications of a Pareto
distribution. That is, for any given job the probability of nding a high-ability
worker is lower than that of nding a low-ability worker. This holds for both
natives and immigrants, but the probability of nding a high-ability worker is lower








The rich structure of the model in terms of rms and workers' heterogeneity
allows us to replicate the evidence that the share of immigrants in total employment
10is indeed highly heterogeneous across Italian rms, even within the same province,
and is usually negatively correlated with rm size and productivity (Bank of Italy,
2009).
2.3 The rm's maximization problem
A rm chooses the level of capital and the number of production workers to maxi-












 rK   wL(n)   IS(fS)
s.t. Y = D (5)
where r is the rental cost of capital, IS is a dummy variable set to one if the rm
decides to screen, n is the number of workers the rm is matched to. Notice that
n is the actual control variable, since the choice of the number of workers to be
matched maps deterministically in the number of (production) workers actually
used in the production process (L). A non-screening rm hires as many workers as
it chooses to be matched to, i.e., L(n) = n, whereas a screening rm hires only those
whose ability is above the threshold ac: by the property of the Pareto distribution,
this is equal to L = n, where  = "F + "N(1   ) is the share of workers
passing the screening test,  the share of immigrants in the local labor force, and
 = aM=ac < 1.
The screening decision determines the employment level (L), the share of im-
migrants (firm) and the average productivity of the workforce ( a). In a non-
screening rm, the share of immigrants is equal that in the local labor market, that
is (firm = ): it hires n migrants and n(1   ) natives. In a screening rm, the
share of immigrants is, again by the properties of the Pareto distribution, equal to
firm = "F=. By the same properties, we can also calculate the average ability
of workers in both types of rms.
Summarizing, the optimal choice on n implies that a rm's employment, its share
11of immigrants and the average ability of its workforce are dened by the following
















where Z1 = 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"F   1
+ (1   )
"N
"N   1
is the weighted average of the expected







"N is the weighted average of the expected abilities
of the two truncated distributions of ability, where the truncation is exogenously
given at ac. Finally, it is trivial to show that Z2 <  < Z1.
Two implications of the model's setting are worth mention. First, within each
province, since immigrants have lower expected abilities than natives, screening
rms have a workforce with higher average ability and a lower share of immigrants.4
Secondly, the share of immigrants in a rm's workforce grows with that in the













Wages are inuenced by rms' screening decisions and workers' outside options.
Bargaining is such that by adjusting employment rms can drive the wage down
to a worker's replacement cost. Since the screening technology is not perfect and
allows rms only to determine whether a worker's ability is above or below a certain
threshold, rms cannot oer a wage schedule conditional on ability but pay the same
wage to all those who are above the threshold.
4The rst part of the statement is shown in lemma 3, point ii). The second one trivially derives
by the inspection of (6), considering that  > 
"F by the denition of .
12Following a standard Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides approach (Diamond, 1982;
Mortensen and Pissarides, 1994), replacement costs depend on workers' outside
options through market tightness. Formally, the replacement cost for a worker of
nationality l = fN;Fg is bl = 0x
1
l , where 0 > 0, 1 > 0 are two constants, and xl
is labor market tightness, dened as the probability of being employed conditional
on being sampled by a rm.
Under the assumption of risk-neutrality, the supply of workers searching for jobs
depends on their expected income elsewhere in the economy, i.e. their outside
option !l. In equilibrium, workers are indierent between seeking for employment
at a given rm and opting for outside income, only if the latter equals the probability
of being sampled and hired (xl) multiplied by the expected wage: !l = xlbl. This







We also suppose that natives' outside option (!N) is greater than immigrants'
one (!F), so that bF < bN.5 From a rm's point of view, the search cost is a
weighted average of the workers' replacement costs and therefore a function of the





F + (1   firm)
N]: (8)


















that is, an increase of the share of immigrants in the local labor force decreases
search costs for both screening and non-screening rms.
As in Helpman et al. (2010), we assume that workers have no incentive to directly
search for rms in each sector. This implies that in equilibrium, a worker's expected
5This is a quite reasonable in the Italian case for at least two reasons. On the one hand,
immigration visas are usually issued only if the immigrant is actually working in Italy, thus driving
the reservation wage down; on the other hand, the law dictates that a foreigner who remains
unemployed cannot renew the annual visa unless he or she nds another job.
13wage conditional on being sampled (and hired) is the same across all rms in a
















represents the probability of a sampled worker being hired by a rm; this is
equal to one for non-screening rms and to
1

< 1 for screening rms. Equation (10)
shows that screening rms pay higher wages since they have, on average, workers
of higher ability, those that are more costly to replace.
Finally, we also suppose that rms have no incentive to directly search for work-
























where El = "l=("l   1) for l = fN;Fg.
2.3.2 Equilibrium factor mix
By maximizing (5) and using (6) and (10), the optimal ratio between capital and






























14for a screening rm. bNS and bS are the search cost for, respectively, non-screening
and screening rms. To show how the equilibrium capital intensity of a prot-
maximizing rm depends on the share of migrants in the local labor market (),
we take logs of equations (13) and (14) and dierentiate with respect to . For the
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We devote the next section to a discussion of the sign of these two partial eects.
2.4 Theoretical predictions
We are now ready to derive our theoretical results. First we show how the equi-
librium capital-labor ratio depends on the share of immigrants in the local labor
force (Lemma 1). When the eect of immigration on capital intensity is positive,
we show that it is larger for screening rms (Lemma 2). Finally, we prove that only
rms with large sales (i.e., demand) nd it optimal to screen workers, so that in
equilibrium there are both screening and non-screening rms (Proposition 1).
Lemma 1
In this economy,
if  > =( 1) (wages are stickier than productivity), migration inows induce
an increase in rms' capital intensity;
if  < =(   1) (productivity stickier than wages), migration inows induce a
decrease in rms' capital intensity;
The proof is in Appendix 2.
The intuition goes as follows. For non-screening rms the inow of immigrants
to a local labor market decreases the search costs (the rst term in (15)) and also,
15by lowering the average ability of workers (the second term in equation (15)), the
marginal product of labor. If  > =(   1), the decrease in the marginal product
of labor is (in modulus) larger than that in search costs, so that rms choose to
substitute capital for labor, raising the capital-labor ratio. The opposite occurs
when  < =(   1). For screening rms, this holds a fortiori, since the eect on
the second term is stronger due to the stochastic dominance of natives' over the
immigrants' distribution of abilities (the third term in equation (16)). Intuitively,
screening rms face higher replacement costs, making it convenient to choose a
larger capital-labor ratio.
Corollary 1 If  > =(   1), the positive eect of migration on the capital-labor
ratio increases with .
Proof of corollary 1
This statement immediately follows from (15) and (16), and the proof of Lemma 1.
Lemma 2
If wages are stickier than productivity ( > =(   1)), and provided that  <
=[( 1)], screening rms have greater incentive to raise their capital-labor ratio
in response to immigration than non-screening rms.
The proof is provided in Appendix 2. The underlying intuition is that, due
to the complementarities among workers, screening rms face a stronger decrease
of labor productivity but also face stickier wages, as their workers are harder to
replace (more skilled workers are rarer due to the Pareto distribution of abilities).
These two eects lead to a larger elasticity of the capital-labor ratio to the inow
of immigrants.
Proposition 1 Only rms with sales larger than a certain threshold, D, screen
workers.
The proof is provided in Appendix 2. Intuitively, since screening is a costly
activity with a xed cost, only rms with large enough revenues can aord it. As a
16result, when  > =(   1), and given Lemma 2 (i.e., the eect of immigration on
capital intensity is larger for screening rms), low-skilled immigration ows induce
a greater capital deepening among larger rms.
2.5 Comparison with Lewis (2011)
Since our result on capital intensity is the opposite of Lewis (2011), discussion of
the relationship between the two papers is needed. Lewis (2011) proposes a model
where labor markets are perfectly competitive, unskilled workers are a substitute for
capital, and skilled workers are complement to capital. In this setting, an increase in
the relative supply of unskilled workers makes them more convenient than capital,
which is accordingly substituted for. Our model encompasses Lewis (2011) but
is more general: while we retain the assumption that blue-collar workers (Lewis's
\unskilled") are a substitute for capital, we allow them to be heterogeneous in
their skills or abilities,6 and the heterogeneity also has a native vs. immigrant
dimension. Moreover, since production is assumed to be increasing in workers'
average ability (i.e.,  > 0), blue-collar workers are complements to one another
so that the presence of very low-skilled workers, as immigrants might be, has a
negative eect on productivity.
It is plain to see that if in our model we mute either dierences in skills between
immigrants and natives or the degree of complementarity among blue-collar workers,
we get the negative impact on capital intensity found by Lewis (2011).














(EF   EN) (17)
and assume that EF = EN, the sign of the derivative becomes negative. This is
because 
F < 
N, due to institutional factors like those described in section 2.3.1
that are independent of abilities.
6In other terms, we are estimating the eect of a change in the skill distribution within blue-
collar workers, while Lewis estimates the eect of a larger blue-collar share in the overall workforce.




=  [(   1)   ]
EF   EN
EF + (1   )EN
: (18)
it is again straightforward to see that setting  = 0, since EF < EN a higher share
of low-skilled immigrants has a negative impact on the capital-labor ratio.
3 The empirical model
Our theoretical model suggests studying the relationship between a change in capital
intensity and an exogenous inow of low-skilled immigrants. Empirically, then, we
estimate the following equation:
gk





ijt + 3Xijt 1 + "ijt; (19)
where i indexes rms, j the province where rm i is located, and t is year-time.
The dependent variable gk
ijt, i.e. the rm-level rate of increase in the capital-labor
ratio, is equal to the dierence between the rate of investment in machinery and
equipment (gK
ijt) and the rate of growth in the number of blue-collar workers (gL
ijt).
The investment rate is computed as the ratio of investment7 at time t (Iijt) to the
installed capital stock at time t   1 (Kijt 1). Importantly, we restrict the focus to
machinery and equipment and production workers because low-skilled immigrants
are mostly production workers and the type of capital that is relevant for such
workers is machinery and equipment, whereas ICT is complementary to white-
collar workers. Thus the coecient of interest 1 captures the correlation between
the variation in capital intensity at rm level and the change in the (log) share of




) in the province.
7Following the empirical investment literature non-convexities in the adjustment cost function
make investments quite lumpy and volatile over time (Doms and Dunne, 1998). It follows that
the distribution of Iijt=Kijt 1 (both cross-sectional and within rm) is characterized by some huge
numbers and very frequent zeros. We deal with this problem by excluding all observations with an
investment-capital ratio larger than one (i.e. all the cases in which a rm more than doubles its
production capacity in a given year).
18Equation (19) includes a series of controls. First of all, contrary to what is
assumed in the theoretical model for the sake of simplicity, in the empirical speci-
cation we control for the rate of increase in share of production workers at the rm
level (gsh blue
ijt ). This is important for two reasons. As Bugamelli et al. (2008) show,
during the last decade Italian rms have reacted to the challenges of globalization
and the European single currency by increasing the share of white-collar workers
used in the production process, but we want the identication of 1 to be net of
this structural change. The inclusion of gsh blue
ijt among the regressors also serves to
control for the eects of low-skilled immigrants inows on rms workforce compo-
sition by skill |the subject of most of the related literature (Lewis, 2004; Gandal
et al., 2004; Card and Lewis, 2007; Dustmann and Glitz, 2007; Peri, 2009; Lewis,
2011). In other words, the eect on capital intensity we want to identify must be
considered as additional to the eects on skill intensity estimated in those papers.
Firms' investment decisions are inuenced by various factors. We control for
nancing conditions by two variables: the amount of cash ow (cashfl) and a self-
scription as credit-rationed (credrat). Investment decisions are also a function of
expected demand, so we add the expected level of demand in the next year (exdem)
and a measure of the degree of uncertainty surrounding that estimate (uncert Guiso
and Parigi, 1999). The type of investment good also inuences the investment
decision. Reasonably, the cost-benet assessment of a new machinery or equipment
changes if the good, once purchased, can be sold in a second-hand market or leased:
we explicitly control for this (rever). In one empirical specication we also add the
lagged dependent variable to take into account the possible stickiness of productive
factors (Bond and Van Reenen, 2007).
The empirical specication contains a full set of xed eects. Firm-level xed
eects (i) control for time-invariant unobservable factors, related for example to
entrepreneurs' abilities or preferences, that could aect the choice of the factor
mix. Country-level common shocks are captured by year xed eect (t) and time-
19invariant local characteristics by provincial xed eects (j).8 Standard errors are
always clustered by province.
3.1 Causality
Firm-level controls and xed eects cannot guarantee that the estimation of 1 is
not biased due to omitted variables or reverse causality. For example, unexpected
local demand shocks may simultaneously aect a rm's demand for capital and labor
and the immigrants' location decision; obviously, the direction of such an omitted
variable bias depends on the eect on capital intensity. Alternatively, a widespread
increase in the capital-labor ratio in a certain region is likely to raise the marginal
productivity of labor, induce an inow of migrants, and so generate an upward bias
in the estimate of 1 (reverse causality).
To address these concerns we resort to an IV estimation that exploit the fact that
immigrants tend to move to areas where other immigrants of the same nationality
are already settled (Altonji and Card, 1991; Saiz, 2007). In other words, we break
the link between immigration ows and business cycle at the provincial level by
instrumenting the former with the exogenous supply-push factors related to network










ct is the predicted number of immigrants in province
j at time t, Limm
ct is the total number of immigrants in Italy from country c at
time t, jc1992 = Limm
jc1992=Limm
c1992 is the share of country c nationals in province j in
1992. To choose country c, we sort the set of all countries of origin in decreasing
order of immigrants population in 1992, and let c range over the subset of the top
twenty countries, which accounted for nearly 80 per cent of the total immigrants
8The provincial xed eect should be redundant in a regression with xed eects at the rm
level, unless some rms change location over time. In our sample this phenomenon is marginal. If
the model is estimated on the subset of rms that do not change location, the results hold true.
20Table 1: Descriptive statistics: Stock of immigrants from the top twenty countries
of origin
country of origin # share cumulative # of immigrants
of immigrants share in mfg., 2005
Morocco 83292 17:28 17:28 51680
Romania 8250 1:71 18:99 38252
Albania 24886 5:16 24:16 35067
Senegal 24194 5:02 29:17 15208
India 9918 2:06 31:23 12943
Ghana 11303 2:35 33:58 12512
Tunisia 41547 8:62 42:20 9387
Nigeria 5627 1:17 43:36 6891
Serbia and Montenegro 25848 5:36 48:73 6640
Pakistan 6983 1:45 50:18 5849
Philippines 36316 7:53 57:71 5794
China 15776 3:27 60:98 4315
Egypt 18473 3:83 64:82 3783
Sri Lanka 12114 2:51 67:33 2872
Poland 12139 2:52 69:85 2679
Brazil 10953 2:27 72:12 1085
Argentina 9603 1:99 74:11 813
Iran 6821 1:42 75:53 605
Ethiopia 7627 1:58 77:11 193
Somalia 9265 1:92 79:03 90
Notes: \# of immigrants" is the stock of immigrants from each country of origin in
1992 from the data set on Italian residents; the countries of origins are the top twenty
by number of immigrants in 1992. The columns \share" and \cumulative share" report
the share and the cumulative share of immigrants from the various countries in the total
stock of immigrants, again in 1992. In the last column we use 2005 data from the Labor
Force Survey on the number of immigrants working in Italian manufacturing industry by
country of origin.
population that year (table 1).9
Exclusion restrictions require that the instrument not be correlated with unob-
served factors that vary with time and province. But since 1992 immigrants were
few in number, it is very unlikely that their presence and therefore their distribu-
tion by provinces at that time could inuence capital intensity later on. Admittedly,
our instrument might not be valid if immigration were concentrated just in a few
provinces, making it impossible to disentangle local and national ows: fortunately,
this is not the case since the provinces numbered 95 in 1992 and the one with the
largest immigrant population share (Milan) did not exceed 15 per cent of total im-
9The same twenty countries accounted for over 70% of total immigration in 2007.
21migration. Moreover, the bulk of immigration has been relatively recent, during a
time when the Italian economy has experienced its longest slowdown, and therefore
the lowest attractiveness, in the post-war period; in 2008 there were 3.4 million
resident foreigners, about 6 per cent of the population, up from less than half that
in 2003 and just 1 per cent in 1991.10
In view of the foregoing, we are quite condent that our instrument is driven
mostly by supply push factors.
4 The data
In the empirical analysis we combine data on the stock of foreigners by country
of origin and Italian province of residence with a data set of manufacturing rms
localized in Italy.
The stock of migrants is taken from the annual permits released by the Italian
Ministry of the Interior. As is clear from the data in Table 1, almost half of the
foreigners residing in Italy are from central and eastern Europe, mainly Albania and
Romania (11.7 and 18.2 per cent, respectively), about a quarter from North Africa,
and about a sixth from Asia. Compared with those in other European countries,
foreign residents in Italy are younger and less educated. Over the period 2005-
07 the median age of those older than 16 was 38, against over 50 in Germany and
France. Among those with aged 25-55, about half had at most compulsory schooling
and only 14 per cent a university degree (in the EU15 the corresponding averages
are 32 and 36 per cent). Using civic register data on provincial population, we




. Figure 1 shows its distribution across
Italian provinces. Quite evidently, the ratio of immigrants to total population was
much higher in central and northern provinces in 1996 (panel a) and, despite more
intense immigration ows, also in 2006 (panel b).
Firm-level data comes from the annual Survey on Investment in Manufacturing
10According to OECD (2007), Italy ranked third (after the US and the UK) among the main
destinations of migration ows in the period 2003-2006.
22Figure 1: The distribution of foreign residents by Italian province
panel a: 1996 panel b: 2006
(SIM), conducted by the local branches of the Bank of Italy. The quality of the SIM
dataset is guaranteed by the close personal relationship between branch ocials of
the Bank of Italy's locales and the rms surveyed and by the intensive data revision
by statisticians at the Bank of Italy.11 Out of the full dataset, we use only the
subsample of manufacturing rms with at least 50 employees, available continuously
since 1984.12
The questionnaires, submitted to companies at the beginning of each year for the
previous year, collect a wide range of information: year of foundation, nationality
of ownership, location, sector of activity, ownership structure, employment (annual
average), investment (realized and planned), sales (domestic and export), capacity
utilization, indebtedness. Information on employment structure is very detailed.
Especially important for our purposes, the data on investment ows are very
detailed: they are separately available for i) land and buildings, ii) machinery and
equipment, iii) transportation goods, and iv) ICT. Here, we take investment in
11Many papers have used these data. Among others, see Guiso and Parigi (1999) and Iranzo
et al. (2008).
12Firms with 20-49 employees were not surveyed until 2002, service rms not until 2001.
23machinery and equipment at constant prices and deate its monetary value with
the corresponding sectoral investment prices from the national accounts. Since
the survey does not give gures on installed capital stock, we rely on the measure
constructed by Bontempi et al. (2010) who matched these survey data with the
balance sheet gures from the Company Accounts Data Service (CADS). Bontempi
et al. (2010) derive the data on capital stocks at constant prices according to the
following formula:
Kit = (1   st)Kit 1 + Iit (20)
where I and  represent, respectively, eective investment at constant prices in
machinery and equipment and the sectoral depreciation rate from the national ac-
counts. To obtain the initial values of the capital stocks, Bontempi et al. (2010)
exploit the \accounting" initial values Ki0 obtained from CADS nominal book val-
ues, deated with the sectoral investment deators.
A measure of investment reversibility (rever) is taken from Bianco et al. (2009).
This is a rm-level dummy variable equal to one if at time t the rm has purchased
or sold investment goods in the second-hand market or leased them.13
Firm-level nominal data on cash ow (cashfl) are derived from CADS.14 We then
deate this with sector-level production deators taken from national accounts and
scale it by lagged capital stock. All the other rm-level regressors are from SIM.
Average employment, available by qualication (white- vs blue-collar workers), is
used to build gsh blue
ijt . The dummy variable credrat is equal to 1 if a rm answers
positively to these three questions: (i) at current market terms would you like
to borrow more?; (ii) would you be willing pay a higher interest rate in order to
borrow more? (iii) have you applied for a loan credit but been turned down? While
13Leasing investment is considered reversible because normally the client has the option to return
the good: as a consequence, leasing rms usually nance goods that enjoy a large second-hand
market. Since this variable is not available in the survey after 2003, for these years Bianco et al.
(2009) have attributed the value of one if the rm operated in the second-hand market at least
twice in the period 1996-2002.
14We subtract dividends from the accounting item "cash ow".
24the expected change in sales (at constant prices) is provided directly by the rm
(exdem), we compute its degree of uncertainty (uncert) as the squared dierence
between the maximum and the minimum values of the expected real change. In
some robustness exercises, we also use SIM data on the current level of sales (sales)
and job turnover (jobtur), the latter being computed as the yearly sum of inows
and outows of workers divided by average employment level for the year.
We limit the empirical analysis to rms located in the Center and North of
the country to avoid the potential bias due to the long-standing, structural back-
wardness of the Southern regions (in per capita GDP, employment rates, relative
manufacturing value added, intensity of immigration). We also drop all observations
for the year 2004 to exclude the jump in the number of residence permits recorded
in 2003 after the enactment of an immigration regularization act (the Bossi-Fini's
amnesty) in 2002.15
The working sample is an unbalanced panel with more than 5,000 observations
(for roughly 1,000 rms) over the period 1996-2007. Descriptive statistics for the
pooled sample are in Table 2. Over the period the production function changed
signicantly, with an average increase in capital and white-collar labor with respect
to blue-collar workers (Bugamelli et al. (2008)). This was accompanied by a 15 per
cent yearly increase in the share of (mostly) low-skilled immigrants. As expected,
average rm size in the dataset we use is quite large, thus making our sample quite
representative of medium-large sized Italian rms. Cash ow amounted on average
to almost 30 per cent of the installed capital stock. The expected annual increase in
sales averages 4 per cent, but with considerable variance across rms and years. The
dierence between maximum and minimum expected demand averages just above
1 percentage point.
25Table 2: Descriptive Statistics: 1996-2007 average
mean sd p50
gk
ijt 0:185 0:298 0:156
gsh blue






Number of employees 536 1369 193
cashfl 0:289 0:375 0:235
credrat 0:025 0:158 0
rever 0:346 0:475 0
exdem 0:037 0:148 0:23
uncer 0:012 0:035 0:003
jobtur 0:271 0:440 0:181
sales 10:810 1:330 10:647
Notes: All variables are averages over the period 1996-2007. gk
ijt is the
growth rate of the ratio of production capital stock to the number of
blue-collar workers at rm level. gsh blue
ijt is the growth rate of the ratio





growth rate of the share of immigrants in total population at province
level. credrat is a dummy variable equal to 1 if a rm declared to be
credit-rationed. cashfl is the deated value of a rm's cash ow scaled
down by its lagged capital stock. rever is a dummy variable equal to 1 if
the investment goods of a rm can be sold on the second-hand market.
exdem is the average change in a rm's next-year expected sales. uncer
is the dierence between maximum and minimum expected changes in
sales. jobtur is the sum of inows and outows of workers in a year
divided by the average employment level that year. Finally, sales is the
logarithmic transformation of a rm's current level of sales.
5 Results
First we estimate equation (19) by OLS. In column (1) of Table 3 we start from
a simple specication that includes only the changes in the share of immigrants and
of blue-collar workers.16 In the specication, while an increase in the share of blue-
collar workers is accompanied by a one-to-one decrease in the (production)capital-
(unskilled)labor ratio,17 immigration has no signicant eect on capital intensity.
Columns (2) and (3) augment the baseline specication in two directions. In col-
umn (2) we control for the nancing status of the rm and the reversibility of its
15In 2003 more than 700,000 foreigners were legalized and so entered in civic registers, articially
inating the 2002-03 increase in the foreign population share.
16Excluding the blue-collar share leaves all estimates basically unchanged.
17This result is consistent with Lewis (2011)









0.002 0.001 0.009 0.209** 0.212** 0.287**
(0.012) (0.012) (0.017) (0.096) (0.095) (0.124)







ijt -1.005*** -1.005*** -0.976*** -1.004*** -1.003*** -0.970***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.016) (0.009) (0.009) (0.017)
rever -0.005 -0.003 -0.005 -0.004
(0.006) (0.008) (0.006) (0.008)
credrat -0.005 -0.016 0.002 0.001
(0.016) (0.023) (0.017) (0.025)
cashfl 0.023*** 0.024** 0.021** 0.020*
(0.008) (0.011) (0.008) (0.012)
Observations 5513 5513 3290 5513 5513 3290
Number of rms 1180 1180 804 1180 1180 804
F rst step 76.84 77.61 52.84
Notes: OLS and IV estimates of equation (19). Firm-level and year xed eects are always included.
Standard errors are clustered by province. The dependent variable gk
ijt is the growth rate of the ratio
of production capital stock to the number of blue-collar workers at rm-level. gsh blue
ijt is the growth





is the growth rate of the share of the stock of immigrants to total population at province
level. credrat is a dummy variable equal to 1 if a rm declared to be credit-rationed. cashfl is
the deated value of a rm's cash ow scaled down by its lagged capital stock. rever is a dummy
variable equal to 1 if the investment goods of a rm can be sold on the second-hand market. exdem
is the average change in the next year's sales expected by a rm in the current year. uncer is the
dierence between the maximum and minimum values of the expected change of sales. *** p<0.01,
** p<0.05, * p<0.1.




is still not signicantly dierent from
zero, the presence of self-nancing (i.e., cash ow) is positively correlated with the
rise in the capital-labor ratio. Results on immigrants do not change when we also
add control for the expected level and uncertainty of future demand (column 3).
Not surprisingly, the level of expected demand is positively correlated with change
in capital intensity. The same holds for the degree of demand uncertainty, as rms
facing greater uncertainty on demand prefer to contain employment more than in-
vestment. In any case, this latter result is statistically not very robust, as we will
see.
Columns (4) through (6) show the IV estimates. While the rm-level controls
have very similar estimated coecients, we now nd a positive, highly signicant




. This implies that OLS estimates were
biased downward, probably due to measurement error, reverse causality or omitted
variables.18 The F-tests for the excluded instruments from the rst stage regressions
(reported in the bottom of Table 3) are safely above the standard levels of the weak
instruments literature (Bound et al., 1995). The implied eect of immigration on
capital intensity is quite large. A one standard deviation increase in the immigrant
share of population induces a rise of 4.6 percentage points in the rate of increase
in capital intensity. The introduction of controls for demand (column (6)) lowers
the number of observations considerably, but without changing the estimate of the
immigration variable. For this reason column (5) is our preferred specication.
5.1 Robustness
We test the robustness of our results in four dimensions: with respect to immigrants'
specialization, job turnover, regional trends and sectoral trends.
18As explained in section 3.1 this may be due to the business cycle eect. Positive local economic
conditions (for example, an increase in aggregate demand) are likely to attract foreign workers to an
area. But as the theoretical model shows, this should not change the factor mix, since technology
and factor prices remain unaected. IV estimates eliminate these cyclical eects and help identify
the causal eects of an exogenous supply of foreign labor.





included among the top twenty countries of origin, nationalities specialized both in
industrial activities (such as Romanians and Senegalese) and in service sectors (Fil-
ipinos and Poles). This might imply an incorrect identication of the causal impact
of immigration in equation (19). For example, as Barone and Mocetti (2011) show,
the arrival of Filipinos domestic workers caused an increase in the labor market par-
ticipation of Italian women, which could ultimately be the main reason why rms
choose a dierent capital-labor ratio.
To deal with this problem, we check whether the eect we nd is indeed at-
tributable to immigrants specialized in manufacturing. More precisely, we dene as
\manufacturing" nationalities the six countries with the largest number of manu-
facturing workers in the 2005 wave of the Labor Force Survey (last column of Table





is the growth rate of the share of immigrants specialized





is that for other immigrants. We compute the instruments accord-
ingly. If the mechanism identied by the theoretical model is correct, we should nd




, and this is exactly what we ob-
serve in the rst column of Table 4. A larger share of immigrants not specialized in
manufacturing causes a decrease in the capital-labor ratio.
The second test follows naturally from the predictions of the theoretical model.
One crucial hypothesis is that the rms that more frequently engage in searching
for workers are more likely to hire immigrants after an exogenous inow of foreign
workers. This implies that rms with a higher job turnover are more exposed to a
deterioration in average quality induced by immigration, and should therefore be
more prone to invest in capital. In column (2) of Table 4 we show the estimates for
immigrants share interacted with a measure of job turnover: the fact that interaction
has a positive and signicant coecient conrms the prediction.
Lastly we test whether the possible presence of omitted variables due to local or
29Table 4: Capital intensity and immigration: robustness
Dependent variable: gk
ijt
Immigrant Turnover Regional Sectoral
specialization trends trends


























ijt -1.002*** -1.003*** -1.004*** -1.005***
(0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
rever -0.008 -0.005 -0.005 -0.004
(0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
credrat 0.011 0.002 0.000 -0.003
(0.021) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017)
cashfl 0.018* 0.021** 0.021** 0.020**
(0.010) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
jobtur -0.025
(0.019)
Observations 5513 5513 5513 5513
Number of rms 1180 1180 1180 1180
F rst step 17.29 39.00 62.64 73.74
Notes: IV estimates of equation (19). Firm-level and year xed eects are always included.
Standard errors are clustered by province. The dependent variable gk
ijt is the growth rate
of the ratio of production capital stock to the number of blue-collar workers at rm-level.
gsh blue
ijt is the growth rate of the ratio of the number of blue-collar workers to that of




is the growth rate of the share of the stock









growth rate of the share of the stock of immigrants specialized in manufacturing (non-
manufacturing) in total population stock at province level. Countries whose workers are
mostly specialized in manufacturing are Morocco, Romania, Albania, Senegal, India and
Ghana. credrat is a dummy variable equal to 1 if a rm declared to be credit-rationed.
cashfl is the deated value of a rm's cash ow scaled down by the its lagged capital stock.
rever is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the investment goods of a rm can be sold on
the second-hand market. jobtur is a rm's yearly sum of inows and outows of workers
divided by the average employment level in the year. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
30sectoral trends may bias the estimates. First we add location dummies (NUTS-1
regions, according to the European Union classication) interacted with year dum-
mies (column (3)); then we insert the interaction between sector and year dummies.
The results are given in the last two columns of Table 4. The key nding is that




remains remarkably stable at the level estimated in the
base regressions of Table 3.
5.2 Heterogeneous eects
The validity of the model's mechanism can be further tested empirically. As Lemma
2 and Proposition 1 show, the impact of immigration on capital intensity can be
heterogeneous across sectors and rms. Empirically, we seek such heterogeneous
eects along two dimensions: rm size, as proxied by the log of sales (sales) and
the degree of complementary across workers ().
The theoretical model shows that rms with greater sales are more likely to
screen their workers and, so should increase their capital-labor ratio more sharply
in the face of an exogenous ow of immigrants. In column (1) of Table 6 the base-





and the level of sales (sales). The positive and statistically signicant
coecient of the interaction term shows that large rms do increase their capital
intensity more than smaller ones, and thus conrms the predictions of the model.
The model also predicts that the positive eect of migration on capital intensity
is stronger, the higher is . In the model,  represents the return on the average
quality of workers. The empirical counterpart of this kind of relationship is not
straightforward. To this end we observe that if a rm's production function is char-
acterized by a high return on the workers' average quality, that rm should opt for a
larger share of skilled workers. Thus we proxy  with the share of skilled workers at
sectoral level using the OECD-STAN database. To ensure exogeneity, we compute
this measure on US data, which are available for 1998. Sectoral variables for  are
provided in table 5. The median value (0.16) is computed on the distribution of
rms.
31Table 5: Sectoral values for 
Sector Skill Intensity Above the median
Food, beverages and tobacco 0.161 YES
Textiles, leather and footwear 0.118 NO
Wood, paper and paper products 0.092 NO
Printing, publishing and reproduction 0.081 YES
Oil rening, coal and coke 0.245 YES
Chemicals and chemical products 0.386 YES
Rubber and plastics products 0.151 NO
Other non-metallic mineral products 0.139 NO
Basic metals and fabricated metal products 0.138 NO
Machinery, n.e.c. 0.147 YES
Computers, electrical machinery 0.281 YES
and communication equipment
Transport equipment 0.260 YES
Manufacturing n.e.c., including furniture 0.155 YES
Notes: Source: OECD STAN
Columns (2) and (3) of Table 6 present the baseline regression separately for sec-
tors with lower and higher skill intensity. Again the results conrm the theoretical
predictions: the eect of immigration is positive for more skill-intensive sectors and
not dierent from zero in sectors with a smaller share of skilled workers.
6 Concluding remarks
The massive global migration has raised considerable concern over the impact on
host country economies of a large number of unskilled immigrants joining the work-
force. In this paper, we have focused on rms and in particular on their choice of
the capital-labor ratio. In this regard, our paper is complementary to the empirical
literature on the impact of immigration on the level of workers' skill level.
Our empirical specication was guided by a theoretical model whereby under
certain conditions, that are very likely to apply to the Italian institutional set-
up, rms may choose to counteract the drop in productivity due to the arrival of
low-skilled immigrants by increasing capital intensity. Empirically the data for a
sample of Italian manufacturing rms over the period 1996-2007 fully validate these
predictions. The result is robust to a number of alternative specications, and IV
estimation indicates that the relationship is causal.



















ijt -1.003*** -1.024*** -1.000***
(0.009) (0.020) (0.010)
rever -0.005 0.002 -0.007
(0.006) (0.011) (0.008)
credrat 0.004 -0.008 0.010
(0.018) (0.031) (0.022)
cashfl 0.020** 0.019 0.022**
(0.009) (0.019) (0.010)
Observations 5513 1622 3891
Number of rms 1180 336 844
F rst step 39.18 25.60 53.28
Notes: IV estimates of equation (19). Firm-level and year xed eects are always
included. Standard errors are clustered by province. The dependent variable gk
ijt
is the growth rate of the ratio of production capital stock to the number of blue-
collar workers at rm-level. gsh blue
ijt is the growth rate of the ratio of the number





the growth rate of the share of the stock of immigrants in total population at
province level. credrat is a dummy variable equal to 1 if a rm declared to be
credit-rationed. cashfl is the deated value of a rm's cash ow scaled down by
the its lagged capital stock. rever is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the investment
goods of a rm can be sold on the second-hand market. sales is the logarithmic
transformation of a rm's current level of sales. jobtur is a rm's yearly sum of
inows and outows of workers divided by average employment level in the year.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
33Appendix
Appendix 1 Conditional demand for factors
From the maximization problem (5) we obtain
K = D
(b)




























and b is the search cost.
Appendix 2 Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1
Non-screening rms - Rewrite equation (15) as (18). The proof follows directly.

































































Conditions (25) and (26) prove the lemma for screening rms.

Proof of Lemma 2
If wages are stickier than productivity, both screening and non-screening rms in-
crease the capital labor ratio as a consequence of the increase in the share of im-
migrants in the province. The dierence between the eect of an increase in the
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35By the denitions of , Z1, and Z2 we have that
EF"F   EN"N =
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=  : (31)
The fourth term is always positive, condition (30) assures that the rst and the third
terms are positive, while condition (31) assures that the second term is positive.
Notice that since  is small  <   and the range of  for which the lemma holds is
\large". 
Lemma 3
In this economy i) bNS < bS and ii) Z1=Z2 < 1.
Proof of Lemma 3
Let us prove i) rst:
bNS < bS since
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)"NEN
which we know holds by condition (32) and the fact that  < 1. 
37Proof of proposition 1
The eect on sales is determined by the screening behavior of rms. In what follows,
we show that the decision to screen is taken by larger rms only. As Lemma 2 shows,
screening rms increase their capital-labor ratio by more than non-screening rms.
Using conditional factor demands we can compute





S(D) = D   rK
S(D)   bSn
S(D)   fS: (34)
Firms screen only if their prots from doing so are greater than from not screening:

S(D)   
NS(D)  0 (35)
Since rms do not direct their search bSn
S(D) = bNSn
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From which we obtain D as
D  D =
fs
r[NS   S]
if NS   S > 0: (37)
We now show that the condition NS   S > 0 holds. Since =(   1) > 1, this


















Notice that by lemma 3, both bNS=bS < 1 and Z1=Z2 < 1, and that if  ! +1
(Z1=Z2) converges to zero. Hence for  large enough condition (38) holds.
Finally, we compute the minimum value of  for which (38) holds. Equalizing





































 < 1 (39)
provided that  > , implying  > 2. Since  > 1, (38) always holds. 
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